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Abstract 
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The Unskilled-and-Unaware Problem (UUP), sometimes referred to as the Dunning-Kruger 
effect for its original discoverers (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), describes the phenomenon 
where poor performers tend to overestimate their abilities while high performers 
underestimate theirs. Dunning (2011) argues that the misestimations of low and high 
performers result from two separate deficits in metacognitive ability. An alternate 
explanation provided by Krueger and Mueller (2002) suggests that the observed results are a 
product of the better-than-average (BTA) heuristic and the statistical artifact of regression to 
the mean. This study controlled for this statistical artifact by reducing measurement error. I 
also tested the metacognition explanation by examining the effects of different forms of 
feedback on misestimation. Results generally replicated previous research in that there was a 
strong negative relationship between performance and misestimation. Additionally, 
misestimations lessened somewhat over time, demonstrating a calibration effect that was 
greatest for participants with more extreme scores. However, calibration was not attributable 
to direct feedback, and calibration was seen even for participants who did not receive 
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feedback, suggesting that how misestimations change over time in combination with 
feedback may be more complicated than previously expected. Given the findings that direct 
feedback on performance had a minimal effect on calibration, results imply that individuals 
may need feedback more verisimilar to that of their everyday experiences to better utilize it 
to inform their self-assessments and reduce misestimation. This has implications for 
improving our interactions in instructional and other performance-based settings.  
Keywords: Unskilled-and-Unaware Problem, Dunning-Kruger effect, regression to the mean, 
better-than-average heuristic, metacognition, feedback, ICAR 
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Abstract 
The Unskilled-and-Unaware Problem (UUP), sometimes referred to as the Dunning-Kruger 
effect for its original discoverers (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), describes the phenomenon 
where poor performers tend to overestimate their abilities while high performers 
underestimate theirs. Dunning (2011) argues that the misestimations of low and high 
performers result from two separate deficits in metacognitive ability. An alternate 
explanation provided by Krueger and Mueller (2002) suggests that the observed results are a 
product of the better-than-average (BTA) heuristic and the statistical artifact of regression to 
the mean. This study controlled for this statistical artifact by reducing measurement error. I 
also tested the metacognition explanation by examining the effects of different forms of 
feedback on misestimation. Results generally replicated previous research in that there was a 
strong negative relationship between performance and misestimation. Additionally, 
misestimations lessened somewhat over time, demonstrating a calibration effect that was 
greatest for participants with more extreme scores. However, calibration was not attributable 
to direct feedback, and calibration was seen even for participants who did not receive 
feedback, suggesting that how misestimations change over time in combination with 
feedback may be more complicated than previously expected. Given the findings that direct 
feedback on performance had a minimal effect on calibration, results imply that individuals 
may need feedback more verisimilar to that of their everyday experiences to better utilize it 
to inform their self-assessments and reduce misestimation. This has implications for 
improving our interactions in instructional and other performance-based settings.  
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Introduction 
 
Deconstructing the Unskilled-and-Unaware Problem:  
Examining the Effect of Feedback on Misestimation  
While Disentangling Cognitive Bias from Statistical Artifact 
 
 People can be poor judges of their own abilities and often 1) miscalibrate their 
performance on a task and 2) provide inaccurate estimates of their relative abilities or 
attributes compared to their peers (Alicke, 1985; Kruger, 1999; Kruger & Dunning, 1999).  
Kruger and Dunning (1999) noticed that this phenomenon followed a pattern; low scoring 
participants generally overestimated their performance and high scoring participants 
sometimes underestimated their performance. Furthermore, the further participants’ scores 
were from the mean, the greater their misestimation was, with poor performers reliably 
showing greater misestimation overall. They coined this phenomenon the Dunning-Kruger 
effect, but a broader literature refers to it as the Unskilled-and-Unaware Problem (UUP; 
Hartwig & Dunlosky,; Krajč, & Ortmann, 2008; Ryvkin, Krajč, & Ortmann, 2012). Kruger 
and Dunning suggested that the reason low scoring individuals overestimated their abilities 
was due to the lack of metacognitive skills necessary to recognize their own incompetence. 
High performers, however, lack information in a different metacognitive area in that they 
overestimate the performance of others, leading them to fail to recognize exactly how well 
they actually did perform in relation to other participants. 
In the following sections, I first provide a basic description of a well-known cognitive 
bias called the better-than-average (BTA) heuristic to provide a context for explaining the 
UUP. I then describe the archetypal design of the studies examining the UUP followed by the 
general pattern of results seen thus far. Following this, I describe the metacognitive 
explanation provided by Dunning, Kruger, and colleagues and focus on the research 
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concerning feedback that both supports and challenges this explanation. The next sections 
discuss an alternative explanation of the UUP and Kruger and Dunning’s reply to this 
alternate account. Following this review of the literature, I state the rationale for this study 
and describe the procedure and study design. I then detail the analyses used to test the 
hypotheses provided as well as the results of these analyses. Lastly, I discuss the conclusions 
derived from these results, their implications, limitations of the study, and future directions. 
Better-than-Average Heuristic 
Considering the BTA heuristic is helpful for understanding the UUP. The BTA 
heuristic, described generally, is a tendency for individuals to estimate that they are above 
average in a positive domain, be it concerning a skill or trait or otherwise (Alicke, 1985; 
Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Krueger & Mueller, 2002). For example, previous research on the 
UUP has found that the majority of participants will estimate that their performance or ability 
is above average in areas as diverse as humor, grammar, logic (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), 
gun-safety knowledge (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008), and 
emotional intelligence (Sheldon, Dunning, & Ames, 2014; discussed more below). These 
examples do not exhaust the list of areas the BTA heuristic has been studied in, but it should 
be noted that the BTA heuristic is considered to be a robust and reliable effect (Guenther & 
Alicke, 2010).  
How does the BTA heuristic relate to the UUP? While the bias resulting from the 
BTA heuristic is common and well-documented, it seems that, at least in some cases, a more 
complex pattern of results emerges that cannot be explained completely by a general trend to 
overestimate one’s abilities. While people do tend to overestimate their abilities on average, 
it appears that sometimes, as will be discussed more below, a small portion of individuals, 
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those who score the highest on a task, actually underestimate their abilities on average 
(Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This suggests that everyone does not use 
the BTA heuristic universally. Furthermore, it appears that the overall magnitudes of 
misestimation of the high and low performers of a task are asymmetrical, suggesting that low 
performers are misestimating their performance more than high performers. These two 
observations suggest that a more complex theory may be needed to explain this pattern of 
results. The UUP has been offered to address these previous limitations. 
The Typical UUP Design 
 While researchers have examined the UUP in many different scenarios using various 
tasks and procedures, the experiments described by Kruger and Dunning (1999) provide a 
prototypical design model that has largely persisted throughout the subsequent work. It 
allows for a concise but still complete description of the basic procedures used and the 
reasoning behind these procedures without the need to describe every experiment in detail. 
Almost every experiment examining the UUP consists of three fundamental aspects: an 
ability measure, the performance estimations made by participants, and an experimental 
manipulation. 
 Ability measure. Fundamental to every UUP study is an ability measure. The 
researchers studying this effect have utilized numerous types of tasks measuring different 
abilities from logic, grammar, and humor (Kruger & Dunning, 1999); to college exam 
performance, debate tournament performance, and gun safety knowledge (Ehrlinger et al., 
2008); to emotional intelligence (Sheldon et al., 2014), among others. While the ability in 
question is not of particular concern, what is paramount is that in each study there is some 
objective ability criterion on which participants can be scored. This provides an objective 
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point of reference (referred to here as the absolute score) to which the participants’ 
estimations of their performance can be compared. Additionally, the absolute scores of 
participants can then be compared to each other to calculate a participant’s relative standing 
(referred to here as their relative score). 
 Performance estimations. The second crucial element to all of the studies conducted 
is the performance estimations provided by the participants after completion of the ability 
measure. In the majority of the studies on the UUP, three performance estimations are 
collected and analyzed: the absolute score estimation, the relative score estimation, and the 
relative ability estimation.1 The absolute score estimation is simply the participant’s 
estimation of how well he or she performed on the ability measure. This estimation is usually 
presented in the form of the number of questions on the ability measure answered correctly 
or the percentage of the items answered correctly. The absolute score estimation is directly 
compared to the absolute score in most studies. The amount of misestimation in an estimated 
absolute score is the discrepancy between the estimated absolute score and the absolute score 
on the ability measure itself. 
 The relative score estimation is the estimation of how well the participant thinks he or 
she performed the task compared with others who performed the task. In previous research, 
this estimation has been represented by percentile rank. Similar to above, the relative score 
estimation can be compared to the participant’s true relative score. In this case, the amount of 
misestimation in the relative score estimation is the discrepancy between the estimated 
relative score and the actual relative score.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The original researchers did not designate specific terms for the performance estimates. 
More recent researchers, however, have begun using these terms to facilitate communication 
and I have chosen to emulate them in this (Krajč, & Ortmann, 2008; Ryvkin, Krajč, & 
Ortmann, 2012) 
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The last estimation present in the previous research is that of relative ability. The term 
relative ability refers to the actual ability of the participant that the task is attempting to 
measure and how this ability compares to others. Unlike the relative score estimation, which 
asks how well the participant performed the task in question compared to others, the relative 
ability estimation asks the participant to estimate how his or her skill in that ability (e.g., 
logic itself) compares to others as a whole. As such, misestimation in relative ability cannot 
be measured as it is impossible to know exactly what the true ability of an individual is.  
 Experimental manipulations. While an exhaustive review of all the experimental 
manipulations used in the past to study the nuances of the UUP is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, a general description of how they are implemented is warranted. Generally the 
researchers establish that a particular ability measure is appropriate to elicit the general 
pattern of results (discussed below) that characterizes the UUP in an initial study. After this 
is done, they may add an experimental condition in a follow up study to examining the effect 
of this condition on the UUP. Some examples include the effect of a feedback condition 
(which will be utilized in this thesis; Kruger & Dunning, 1999), training (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999), monetary incentives for estimation accuracy (Ehrlinger et al., 2008), and constructive 
feedback on how to improve one’s performance (Sheldon et al., 2014). These experimental 
manipulations provide additional insight into the discrepancy between the magnitude and 
direction of misestimation of high and low performers. 
General Pattern of Results in UUP Research 
 A strong pattern of results has emerged from the body of research on the UUP. While 
not every study replicates these results exactly, there is clearly a pattern that generalizes 
across the studies that can be summarized in four main points. The first is that the majority of 
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participants overestimate their performance and this overestimation often exceeds the 
sample’s mean performance. This point reflects the BTA heuristic discussed above. The 
second is that low performers tend to overestimate their scores and high performers tend to 
underestimate their scores. The third is that, for both high and low performers, the further 
away from the mean their absolute score falls, the greater their misestimation is on average. 
The fourth is that the magnitude of the misestimation is greater for poor performers than it is 
for high performers. These four points can be easily seen in Figure 1, reproduced from 
Dunning and Kruger (1999). 
Metacognitive Explanation for the UUP 
As an explanation for the UUP, Dunning (2011) argues that the misestimations of the 
scores of bottom and top performers are caused by a lack of metacognitive ability; that is, 
knowing about knowing. This lack of relevant information, however, stems from two 
separate sources of knowledge for the two groups: The bottom performers lack knowledge 
about their own incompetence whereas the top performers lack knowledge about the 
incompetence of others. The bottom performers, Dunning argues, suffer what he calls a 
“double burden.” The first burden is that their general lack of ability in the domain being 
tested leads them to make numerous mistakes. The second burden is that the same factors 
that cause these individuals to perform poorly make it extremely difficult for them to identify 
their mistakes even upon being informed that they are incorrect. This is because the ability to 
identify a mistake, according to Dunning, requires the ability to differentiate the mistaken 
answer from the correct answer. In other words, to identify a mistake, one must possess the 
requisite skills needed to answer the question correctly in the first place. High performers, 
however, suffer from a different, and arguably lesser, cognitive bias. The high performers 
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mistakenly assume that, because the test was relatively easy for them, that it was most likely 
relatively easy for their peers (Dunning, 2011; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; 
Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This bias is typically referred to as the 
false-consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).  
 The varied effect of feedback on high and low performers’ misestimation as 
support for the metacognition explanation.  Dunning (2011) argues that high and low 
performers’ misestimations are caused by a lack of knowledge stemming from two different 
sources. The low performers lack accurate knowledge of their absolute score. They 
consistently overestimate their absolute score because they lack the requisite ability to 
identify when they have made a mistake.  This overestimation results from poor performers 
assuming that, even when they are unsure of what the correct answer or choice in a situation 
is, their guess is a reasonable one or is likely correct. Poor performers then go on to use this 
incorrect assessment of their performance to estimate how well they are doing relative to 
others. By doing so, they tend to also overestimate their relative scores, a pattern that has 
been demonstrated several times (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Sheldon et 
al., 2014). High performers, however, are consistently accurate in judging their absolute 
score, at least compared to low performers. This is because they do not lack the requisite skill 
to identify their own mistakes. High performers lack only accurate knowledge of how others 
performed, making them unable to judge their own performance relative to others. High 
performers mistakenly overestimate the average performance and ability of others and, 
consequently, underestimate their relative score and ability. 
 Some preliminary evidence for these two hypotheses comes from the results of 
Kruger and Dunning (1999)’s third experiment. In this experiment, participants were asked to 
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complete a grammar test and then to estimate their absolute score, their relative score, and 
their relative ability. A few weeks later, participants in the top and bottom quartiles, based on 
their previous performance, were asked to return to the laboratory under the cover story that 
they were to grade the tests of five other participants. The tests that they graded reflected the 
range of scores, the mean, and the variability of the actual scores of the full sample, a fact 
that was explained to the participants. After grading, participants were shown their test again 
and asked to re-estimate their absolute and relative scores along with their relative ability. 
The effect of this additional information on their re-estimations differed for high and low 
performers.  
High performers, who had initially underestimated their relative score and ability, re-
estimated their relative score and ability much more accurately after receiving feedback, 
providing evidence that they suffered from a false-consensus bias. They did not change their 
absolute score estimations, which were already fairly accurate, but this was not expected to 
happen as the false-consensus bias should only concern one’s relative standing. Poor 
performers, however, failed to more accurately re-estimate their performance or ability. 
Additionally, they were significantly less accurate in grading the tests than the high 
performers, providing evidence that their lack of ability to correctly answer the questions 
prevented them from recognizing both their own and others’ errors and prevented them from 
using the new information to make accurate relative score and ability estimates. 
Ehrlinger et al. (2008) documented a similar trend in an analysis of four earlier 
studies examining the UUP. Using counterfactual regression analyses, the authors attempted 
to estimate what the misestimation of high and low performers would have been had they 
been given feedback on their absolute or relative score. It is important to note that the 
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feedback being discussed here is qualitatively different than that given by Kruger and 
Dunning (1999) who allowed their participants to glean feedback by examining the errors of 
others. The feedback proposed in Ehrlinger et al. refers to accuracy-based feedback that 
would be given directly to the participants, not feedback based on infereces that participants 
would have to construct themselves. However, it is critical to note that this feedback was not 
actually given; instead, the analysis simulated what the researchers expected to happen if the 
feedback had been given. 
From this analysis the authors concluded that for poor performers, who greatly 
overestimated their absolute and relative scores on average, receiving feedback about their 
absolute score (i.e., knowing how many questions they had answered correctly) would have 
allowed them to better estimate their relative score (i.e., how well they did compared to other 
participants). Receiving feedback about the relative scores of others, however, may have led 
poor performers to further overestimate their own performance. This is because poor 
performers overestimated the relative scores of other participants (i.e., poor performers 
estimated that the other participants did better on average than they actually did). In light of 
this, the poor performers’ relative score estimates were artificially attenuated by their 
overestimation of the performance of other participants on average. Had this overestimation 
of the performance of others been corrected by actual feedback on their relative score, poor 
performers may have further overestimated their own relative score. The effect of feedback 
on misestimation is thought to be different for high performers, however. The authors 
propose that feedback concerning either high performers’ absolute or relative scores would 
have led to a reduction in misestimation overall because high performers both underestimated 
their own absolute score and overestimated the absolute scores of the other participants.  
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These interpretations have not been universally supported, however. Ryvkin et al. 
(2012) conducted two studies to assess how feedback affected the UUP.  In their first study, 
the researchers examined how feedback affected estimations of future exam performance. 
They asked students to predict their absolute and relative scores on a midterm and a final 
exam. Students’ predictions of their midterm performance were collected at the beginning of 
the semester when students had little knowledge about the course and again minutes before 
taking the midterm. Students were not provided with any kind of formal feedback (e.g., exam 
grades) between their first and second midterm predictions, but were provided with 
opportunities for environmental feedback over the intervening weeks consisting of their 
impressions of the course material and its overall difficulty. The students then made a third 
prediction about their absolute and relative score on their final exam minutes before taking 
the exam. Feedback differed between the second midterm prediction and the final prediction 
in that students were provided with direct feedback (i.e., grade on their midterm and relative 
standing in the class) after the midterm along with continuing environmental feedback. 
Previous work on the UUP would suggest that the unskilled in the class, while they 
might benefit some from direct feedback, would not benefit from the environmental feedback 
present between the first and second midterm predictions in this study. This is because it is 
thought that the poorest performing individuals are incapable of recognizing their own 
incompetence and therefore fail to properly incorporate the feedback they receive in their 
predictions of absolute and relative performance, especially when they must construct this 
feedback for themselves from their experience in the course. However, this did not seem to 
be the case. The environmental feedback that the participants received between the first and 
second midterm predictions seemed to not only result in better calibration in predicted exam 
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performance overall, but had the greatest effect on the poorest performers, possibly because 
these students had the most room to improve. This trend continued after the midterm for the 
final exam prediction when participants received both environmental and direct feedback; see 
Figure 2, reproduced from Ryvkin et al. (2012). The results of this study showed that 
feedback, especially direct feedback, can largely mitigate the UUP. 
To exert more control and to address some of the limitation of their first study, the 
researchers conducted an experiment using the same participants from Study 1. In this 
experiment, participants were asked to complete two tasks, each with two stages. The first 
task was a simple math exercise where participants had to sum as many 2-digit numbers as 
they could in a 3-minute time limit both in Stage 1 and Stage 2. The second task asked 
participants to compare the populations of 20 random pairs of European countries in Stage 1 
and the populations of the of 40 out of the 50 most populated countries at Stage 2. After each 
stage for each task, participants estimated their absolute and relative scores in a manner more 
similar to previous research than the predictions used in Study 1. At Stage 2 of each task, half 
of the participants received feedback about their absolute and relative performance from 
Stage 1 before making their absolute and relative score estimations, while the other half 
received no feedback.  
For the first task, the misestimations of high and low performers at Stage 1 mirrored 
that of previous research, as can be seen in Figure 3, reproduced from Ryvkin et al. (2012). 
Low performers were overconfident in their absolute and relative scores, while high 
performers accurately estimate their absolute score and slightly underestimate their relative 
score. This was not true of the second task, where the previous pattern of results was only 
replicated for the relative score estimates. Of most importance is the effect of feedback on 
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performance estimates. This experiment replicates the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating 
that feedback about one’s absolute and relative score can reduce misestimation, especially for 
poor performers, and it does so using a design comparable to previous research on the UUP. 
Participants who did not receive feedback showed no improvement in the calibration of their 
estimations. This provides some evidence for the utility of environmental feedback 
demonstrated in Study 1. 
 This experiment unfortunately suffered from a few important limitations. The first 
was the difficulty level of the two tasks used. Performance on the first task demonstrated 
differences in ability among participants, but this difference was apparent only in the speed 
of completion (i.e., the number of problems solved) and not in the overall level of accuracy. 
While speed of completion of math problems is a valid assessment of ability, it is not 
necessarily comparable to other ability measures in regard to estimating one’s absolute score. 
Task 2 suffered from a pronounced ceiling effect, reducing its utility to examine the 
relationship between performance and estimations.  
Additionally, this experiment does not allow for the comparison of different forms of 
feedback. In their counterfactual regression analysis, Ehrlinger et al. (2008) proposed that 
receiving feedback about one’s absolute and relative scores will have different effects on 
high and low performers, but that may only be examined by separating the two types of 
feedback. Finally, Ryvkin et al. (2012) noted that the restriction of range in ability of their 
population, along with the fact that students are intrinsically motivated to increase their 
academic achievement, might have affected their results. The current study addressed these 
three limitations, as discussed below. 
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An Alternate Explanation for the UUP: Regression to the Mean and the Better-Than-
Average Heuristic 
An alternative to the metacognition explanation given for the pattern of results 
observed thus far argues that, coupled with the BTA heuristic, regression to the mean 
explains the misestimations observed and that, when controlled for, the asymmetry in the 
misestimations disappears (Krueger & Mueller, 2002). The rationale behind this explanation 
is based on the observation that research on the UUP has frequently utilized ability measures 
with low levels of reliability and validity (i.e., instruments with much measurement error) 
and extreme group selection (usually top and bottom quartiles). When reliabilities are low 
and extreme performers are focused on, misestimations may be exaggerated. When scores on 
a measure are normally distributed, the likelihood that participants’ observed scores are 
closer to the mean than their true score (i.e., what their score would be if no random 
measurement error existed) is equal to the likelihood that their observed scores are further 
from the mean than their true scores, even with measures with low reliability. However, 
when extreme scores are examined in isolation from the full distribution (as has been the case 
in most of the UUP literature), this introduces a systematic inclusion bias, such that some 
individuals with more extreme observed scores relative to their more moderate true scores (a 
difference attributable to the random error of the measurement) are more likely to be 
included in each extreme group, but individuals with more moderate observed scores relative 
to their true scores are less likely to be included in the extreme groups. The extreme group 
selection process may then result in exaggerated misestimations between participants’ 
observed scores and their estimated scores, relative to the differences between their true 
scores and their estimated scores. This artifact of measurement error, coupled with the well-
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documented BTA effect, may account for the general pattern of UUP results demonstrating 
overestimation for poor performers and underestimation for high performers. 
However, it is not clear from any single set of results which explanation is preferred, 
especially because, up until this point, they have only been compared independently. 
Therefore, it seemed prudent to design a study specifically intended to measure the effect of 
regression to the mean on the accuracy of estimations of ability. Dunning, Kruger, and 
colleagues acknowledge that a regression to the mean effect may be present in the 
misestimations of performance, though they minimize its potential importance. Those who 
argue that the misestimation of ability is primarily the result of a lack of metacognitive 
abilities claim that the regression to the mean effect is negligible as long as reasonably 
reliable measures of ability are used (Dunning, 2011; Dunning et al.,!2003; Ehrlinger et al., 
2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
One clear way to measure and control for the effect of regression to the mean is to 
employ a repeated-measure design using multiple alternate forms of a measure. While it is 
true that the regression to the mean effect is caused in large part by the inherent unreliability 
of a test, and while it is true that alternate forms of a test can never be perfectly equivalent in 
either their ability to measure a construct or their reliabilities, the regression to the mean 
effect should still be distributed relatively equally across participants if all participants take 
all forms of the test, provided enough versions of the test are used. Moreover, when the 
scores across all tests are averaged, the regression to the mean effect should be reduced. In 
short, participants who score in the extremes on one form of the test (i.e., those who have 
been the focus of previous studies) should be more likely to score closer to the mean on the 
alternative forms of the test, even though their absolute skill in the area being tested is not 
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changing. To what extent this occurs is of particular interest in resolving the conflict between 
the alternate explanations described above. 
Rationale of the Study and General Description of Procedures 
 The goals of this experiment were manifold. The first goal was to replicate the pattern 
of results that characterize the UUP in a large, representative sample of adults rather than the 
typical small student sample. While adult non-students have been used in a smaller scale 
study before (e.g., Ehrlinger et al., 2008, Experiment 3), the risk for restriction of range of 
the ability being measured was still present, as the sample comprised adults at a skeet 
tournament and the ability measure used was a test of gun safety knowledge. Using a more 
representative sample allowed me to address some limitations that the restriction of range of 
cognitive abilities found in college populations might have had on previous results. This is 
especially pertinent considering I used a cognitive measure, the International Cognitive 
Ability Resource (ICAR; Condon & Revelle, 2014), as my ability measure.  
The second goal of this experiment was to more acutely examine the effect of 
regression to the mean on misestimations. While some previous studies have addressed 
whether or not the UUP was the result of this statistical artifact, their conclusions were 
limited. Because no measure is perfectly accurate, and thus all measures are affected by 
regression to the mean to some extent, I am instead concerned with measuring how much this 
artifact affects misestimation. To address this, I employed a repeated-measure design to 
measure the extent to which each individual’s score regresses to the mean over time. By 
doing so, I hope to accurately disentangle the effect of this artifact from the UUP. 
The third and fourth goals of this experiment were interrelated. Research on the effect 
of feedback on misestimation by Ryvkin et al. (2012) contradicts predictions made by 
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previous researchers of the UUP (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). However, 
this latter research suffered from a few limitations, namely, the lack of control and the 
limitations of the measures used. This experiment sought to simultaneously address the 
limitations of the work of Ryvkin et al. (2012) while addressing the inconsistency of their 
results with the predictions made by Kruger and Dunning (1999) and Ehrlinger et al. (2008). 
I did this by employing a more standardized and better validated ability measure with known 
psychometric qualities and comparing the misestimations of four feedback conditions over 
four trials. Participants in this study completed the four subtests and after each one provided 
estimations of their performance. Some participants received one or both of two different 
kinds of feedback and the effect of this feedback over time was compared across groups. 
Hypotheses. My hypotheses are best considered in two sections: those for which 
most previous researchers (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Ryvkin et al., 
2012) agree and those for which these researchers disagree (See Tables 1 and 2 for a visual 
representation of the hypotheses and each associated statistic). 
Converging hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1a. Participants will overestimate their absolute and relative performance 
on average. 
Hypothesis 1b. The magnitude of this overestimation will be negatively related to 
participants’ performance overall, replicating the UUP. 
Hypothesis 2a. Poor performing participants will overestimate their absolute and 
relative scores. 
Hypothesis 2b. High performing individuals will underestimate their relative scores 
but not their absolute scores (or if they do so, only very slightly). 
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Hypothesis 3. Poor performers will exhibit more absolute and relative overestimation 
than high performers. 
Unexplored feedback hypothesis: Current Researcher. 
Hypothesis 4.0. Feedback condition will have no effect on participants’ actual scores. 
Competing feedback hypotheses: Ehrlinger et al. (2008) and Kruger and Dunning 
(1999). 
Hypothesis 4.1. High, but not low, performers will be able to use environmental (i.e., 
indirect) feedback to better calibrate their absolute and relative performance estimates over 
time. 
Hypothesis 5.1a. Direct feedback on absolute performance will improve both absolute 
and relative estimations for high and low performers. 
Hypothesis 5.1b. Direct feedback on relative performance will improve relative 
estimations for high performers but exacerbate relative misestimations for poor performers. 
Competing feedback hypotheses: Ryvkin et al. (2012). 
Hypothesis 4.2a. The absolute and relative estimations of both high and low 
performers may benefit from indirect, environmental feedback over time (i.e., trials). 
Hypothesis 4.2b. If absolute and relative estimations benefit from environmental 
feedback over time, the greatest improvement in calibration will occur for poor performers. 
Hypothesis 5.2. (No clear differentiation of the effect of absolute and relative 
feedback is clear from this study.) 
Competing regression to the mean hypothesis: Ehrlinger et al. (2008) and Kruger 
and Dunning (1999). 
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Hypothesis 6.1. The extent to which participants’ absolute scores will regress to the 
mean across trials will be negligible. 
Competing regression to the mean hypothesis: Krueger and Mueller (2002). 
Hypothesis 6.2a. Participants’ absolute scores will tend to regress to the mean across 
trials. 
Hypothesis 6.2b. Participants with the most extreme absolute scores will show the 
greatest regression effect.  
Method 
Participants 
 A statistical power analysis was conducted in order to determine how many 
participants would be needed to provide sufficient power to detect differences between the 
groups in this study, should differences actually exist (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). Because previous research has not reported effect sizes for the UUP, a very 
conservative effect size was used to ensure that my sample would be large enough to detect 
small effects. This power analysis indicated that a sample of at least 308 participants would 
be required to detect small differences between groups (d = 0.20, α = .05, β = .10) for my 
core statistical tests. Therefore, to allow for potential losses associated with poor data quality 
and the additional planned analyses, I decided to recruit approximately 450 participants 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Research by Holden, Dennie, and Hicks (2013) 
has shown that the quality of data provided by MTurk users is comparable to that of 
traditional research subject pools (e.g., undergraduates). The only restrictions that were 
placed on participant recruitment were that participants must be at least 18 years of age or 
older at the time of the study and from the United States. Participants voluntarily agreed to 
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complete the measure through MTurk using Qualtrics survey software. Participants were 
informed that their participation was voluntary and that they could choose to end their 
participation at any time. Participants were paid $1 upon completion of the task. I received 
approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Appalachian State University on 
12/08/2014 to conduct this experiment (see Appendix A).  
Two listwise deletion criteria were used in this study in an attempt to remove 
participants who were likely not taking the study seriously. The first was the removal of 
participants with incomplete data. The second was the removal of participants who had a 
score of 0 of 10 on two or more of the subtests. Of the 483 participants with at least partial 
data, 38 failed one or both of these exclusion criteria and were thus dropped, leaving 445 
participants in my sample (234 female, 210 male, 1 unanswered) ranging from 18 to 77 years 
of age (M = 36.06, SD = 12.41, median = 33 years). Of the participants in my sample, 15.1% 
had a high school diploma or less, 35.3% had some college education, 37.3% had a 
Bachelors degree, and 12.1% had a graduate degree (one participant chose not to answer). 
Design 
 The design of this experiment was a 4x4 mixed design with four between-group 
feedback conditions and four within-group ten-item ICAR subtests. The four feedback 
conditions were the no feedback condition, the absolute feedback condition, the relative 
feedback condition, and the combined feedback condition (described more below). 
Materials 
 Test and subtest development. Four subtests consisting of 10 multiple-choice items 
each were developed using items from the 60-item version of the ICAR (Condon & Revelle, 
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2014).2 The ICAR is a newly developed public-domain measure of cognitive ability. The 
items in the ICAR are grouped into four categories: 9 Letter and Number Series items, 11 
Matrix Reasoning items, 16 Verbal Reasoning items, and 24 Three-Dimensional Rotation 
items. Of the 24 Three-Dimensional Rotation items, 12 were discarded in formation of my 
measure due to the relatively high difficulty of these items compared to the 36 remaining 
items. As a result, 3 Three-Dimensional Rotation items appeared in each subtest. Likewise, 8 
of the 9 Letter and Number series items were used to allow two to appear in each subtest. 
Additionally, 8 of the 11 Matrix reasoning items were used placing two in each subtest. 
Finally, 12 of the Verbal reasoning items were used, resulting in 3 appearing in each subtest 
for a total of 10 items in each subtest. I selected the Three-Dimensional Rotation items with 
the lowest item difficulty to maintain a more similar difficulty with the other items. The rest 
of the items were selected to maximize the variability of item difficulties while maintaining a 
balance of easier and harder items. Items were allocated to each subtest in such a way as to 
maintain a standard overall level of difficulty and a standard variability of difficulty. Because 
the normed item-level difficulties of the ICAR are published, I was able to nearly equate the 
tests in difficulty (at optimal levels around .50, mean = .504, range: .493 to .512) and 
standard deviation (0.211 to 0.224). Reliability analyses indicated that subtest reliabilities 
were comparable; Subtest 1 had an alpha of .69, Subtest 2 had an alpha of .63, Subtest 3 had 
an alpha of .74, and Subtest 4 had an alpha of .63. The 40-item full test had a much higher 
alpha of .90. Additionally, scores on the four subtests were highly correlated (average r = .70, 
range = .66 - .73, all ps <.001). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For more information on the ICAR, visit its companion website icar-project.org. 
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Procedures 
 Upon opting to participate in the experiment on MTurk, participants read a 
description of the study informing them that they would complete four 10-item multiple-
choice tests and that, upon completion of the study, they would be compensated $1 for their 
participation. They were also informed that, after the completion of each test, they would be 
asked to provide estimations of their performance on each test and that, after they provide 
these estimations, they may or may not receive feedback on their performance. After this, the 
participants were then assured that their information would be kept confidential and that they 
were free to withdraw from the study at any point without consequence. Participants then 
acknowledged that they understood these terms. Upon accepting these terms, participants 
read more detailed instructions about the experiment including instructions about how to 
answer the test questions, how to provide their estimations of their performance, and how to 
interpret the feedback that is given to them (for the exact wording of these instructions and 
examples provided to the participants, see Appendix B). Once the participants indicated that 
they understood these instructions, they completed the four subtests and provide estimations 
on their performance (described more below). Participants were then asked to answer 
demographic questions about their age, gender, and education level, debriefed, thanked for 
their participation, and provided a code they could use to collect their compensation. 
 Feedback conditions. This study utilized four feedback conditions: a control no 
feedback condition, an absolute feedback condition, a relative feedback condition, and a 
combined absolute and relative feedback condition. The procedure common to all four 
conditions is that, after completing a subtest, participants provided an initial estimation of 
their absolute and relative score on that subtest. This allowed for an initial comparison to be 
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made across all four conditions after the completion of the first subtest and score estimations 
to insure that there were no differences between the conditions at this point.  
Then, depending on which condition they were in, participants may or may not have 
received some form of feedback. The first condition was the no feedback condition and 
participants did not receive any feedback. Participants in this condition simply completed the 
first subtest, provided an estimation of their absolute and relative scores, and then repeated 
the process with the three following subtests. The next condition was the absolute feedback 
condition. In this condition, participants completed a subtest and provided an initial 
estimation of their absolute and relative scores. Following this, they were informed of how 
many of the 10 questions they answered correctly. This process was repeated with each 
subsequent subtest. The relative feedback condition was identical to the absolute feedback 
condition except that instead of receiving feedback about the number of questions they 
answered correctly, participants were provided information on how their performance 
answering these questions compared with that of the normed ICAR population. Participants 
in this condition were informed of what percentage of people they scored higher than on each 
subtest. Participants in the combined absolute and relative feedback condition followed the 
same procedure but received both forms of feedback after each subtest. 
Results 
 The purpose of this results section is not only to present the findings of this 
experiment, but also to compare the pattern of results found in most of the previous research 
where only a single observation was used to those of this study where multiple observations 
were examined. To do this, this section is organized primarily by the hypotheses detailed 
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above. When hypotheses are being examined using t-tests, bivariate correlations, and One-
Way ANOVAs, three separate comparisons are made for each hypothesis.  
The first serves to emulate most of the previous research by examining only 
performance at Trial 1 (T1) and (mis)estimations of performance at T1 (summed values for 
absolute estimations, averaged values for relative estimations). That is, only the scores and 
estimations for the first test are examined. The second analysis then examines performance at 
T1 and total estimations (i.e., perceptions of performance across all four trials). These 
analyses illustrate how the relationship between performance and estimations differs when 
the same grouping as the previous analyses (T1 quartiles) are maintained but are compared to 
total estimations. Lastly, the third analysis examines the relationship of total score with total 
estimations. This process is presented twice for each hypothesis: one set of comparisons for 
absolute estimations and one for relative estimations. When Mixed-ANOVAs are used, only 
the second and third of these comparisons are made. When multilevel modeling is used, only 
the last comparison is made (See Tables 3 and 4 for Ms and SDs).  
Validity Checks 
 While the effect of feedback on actual performance has not been examined 
specifically in the context of the UUP, it seemed prudent to perform a validity check to 
examine if the total scores (i.e., the actual scores of the participants) differed between 
feedback conditions (Hypothesis 4.0). Results of a one-way ANOVA confirm that feedback 
had no effect on actual performance, F(3, 441) = 0.10, p = .96, ηp2 = .00.  
To examine whether participants understood how to properly estimate their absolute 
and relative performance, the correlation of the sum of their absolute estimations across 
subtests and their average relative estimations was calculated. The result of this bivariate 
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correlation showed that absolute and relative estimations were highly and positively 
correlated, r(443) = .64, p < .001, indicating that participants who estimated that they scored 
highly on the tests also estimated that their score was higher than most other participants. 
This suggests that the participants did understand how to report their estimates of their 
absolute and relative performance. When the correlation between absolute and relative 
estimates were examined for each subtest separately (e.g., absolute and relative estimations 
for Subtest 1, absolute and relative estimations for Subtest 2), a similar pattern of results was 
found (average r = .57, range = .54 - .57, all ps <.001). 
Converging Hypotheses  
 Hypothesis 1a. The hypothesis that participants would overestimate their scores on 
average examined the reliance on the BTA heuristic in my sample. Paired-samples t-tests 
compared participants’ actual scores to their estimated absolute scores. Results of these 
analyses demonstrated that the participants’ average estimated absolute scores at T1 were 
significantly higher than their average absolute scores at T1, t(444) = 5.17, p < .001, d = 
0.25. When examining participants’ performance at T1 to their total absolute estimations, 
their average estimated absolute scores at T1 were significantly higher than their average 
absolute scores overall (when total score was converted to a comparable metric), t(444) = 
5.79, p < .001, d = 0.28.  Lastly, participants’ average total estimated absolute scores were 
significantly higher than their total average absolute scores, t(444) = 18.71, p < .001, d = 
0.68. These results replicate previous research on the UUP and the BTA heuristic and show 
that a stronger overestimation effect was observed when comparing estimates to performance 
across all four trials. 
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 Additionally, Hypothesis 1a predicted that participants would overestimate their 
relative scores on average. To test this hypothesis, I conducted paired-sample t-tests to 
determine if participants’ average estimated relative scores differed significantly from their 
true average relative scores.  Results of the first analysis showed that participants’ estimated 
relative scores at T1 were significantly lower on average than their relative scores at T1, 
t(444) = -3.94, p <.001, d = -0.19. When scores at T1 were compared to total relative 
estimations, I found that participants’ total estimated relative scores were still significantly 
lower on average than their relative scores at T1, t(444) = -5.45, p <.001, d = -0.26. Lastly, 
participants’ total estimated relative scores were significantly lower on average than their 
true relative average, t(444) = -6.72, p <.001, d = -0.27. This does not support my directional 
hypothesis and suggests that, on average, the participants in this sample believed they 
performed worse than the average participant.  
 Hypothesis 1b. Previous research suggests that there should be a negative 
relationship between participants’ absolute scores and the extent to which they misestimate 
their absolute performance, such that the poorest performers exhibit the most misestimation. 
To test this hypothesis, I first calculated the extent to which participants misestimated their 
absolute scores by finding the difference between their estimated absolute scores and their 
true absolute scores such that positive values represent overestimation of absolute 
performance and negative values indicate underestimation. Results of a bivariate correlation 
found that there was indeed a significant negative correlation between absolute misestimation 
at T1 and absolute score at T1, r(443) = -.46, p < .001. The same was true when total 
absolute misestimations were correlated to scores at T1, r(443) = -.35, p < .001. Total 
absolute score and absolute misestimation showed a similar negative relationship, r(443) = -
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.41, p < .001. These results support my hypothesis, replicate the findings of previous 
researchers, and suggest that the better participants performed, the less they overestimated 
their absolute scores. However, the strengths of the relationships between scores and absolute 
misestimations in these three analyses did not differ from each other, though this difference 
did approach significance, Z = -1.63, p = .052.  
Similarly, Hypothesis 1b also predicted that there would be a negative relationship 
between participants’ actual performance and the extent to which they misestimate their 
relative scores. To test this hypothesis I first calculated the participants’ percentile rank (i.e., 
relative scores) from their actual scores. I then found the difference between the participants’ 
estimated relative scores and their actual relative scores such that positive numbers indicate 
overestimation relative to the performance of other participants in the sample. Results of a 
bivariate correlation between participants’ total relative scores and their relative 
misestimation found that there was indeed a strong significant negative correlation between 
relative misestimation at T1 and performance at T1, r(443) = -.62, p < .001. A similar 
relationship was found between total relative misestimation and score at T1, r(443) = -.57, p 
< .001. This pattern persisted when examining the relationship between total relative 
misestimation and total performance, r(443) = -.69, p < .001. These results support my 
hypothesis, replicate the findings of previous researchers, and suggest that the poorest 
performing participants exhibited the most relative misestimation on average. These results 
also indicate that the strengths of the relationships between performance and relative 
misestimations did not differ from each other, Z = -0.97, p = .166. 
 Hypothesis 2a. To more closely examine participants’ misestimation, and to replicate 
previous research, misestimations of low and high performers were examined separately. 
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Previous research has reliably shown that poor performers consistently overestimate their 
performance and this was hypothesized in the current study. Three paired-samples t-tests 
compared the absolute and estimated scores of participants whose scores fell below the 25th 
percentile. Results of the first analysis indicated that participants in the bottom quartile on T1 
estimated that, on average, they answered significantly more questions correctly than they 
actually did, t(93) = 9.02, p < .001, d = 0.93. This pattern continued when these participants’ 
(those in the bottom quartile at T1) scores were compared to their total absolute estimates 
t(93) = 16.26, p < .001, d = 1.68. When comparing the total absolute estimations to the total 
score of participants in the bottom quartile based on their total score, poor performing 
participants estimated that they answered significantly more questions correctly than they 
actually did, t(99) = 13.53, p < .001, d = 1.86. These results indicate that not only did poor 
performing participants overestimate their absolute scores on average, this overestimation 
was greatest when all four trials were examined. 
Additionally, Hypothesis 2a predicts that poor performing participants would 
overestimate their relative scores as well. To test this hypothesis, I conducted three paired-
samples t-tests and found that poor performing participants’ (those falling below the 25th 
percentile on T1) relative score estimations for T1 were significantly higher than their actual 
average relative score on T1, t(93) = 7.95, p < .001, d = 0.82. This pattern continued when 
participants’ total relative score estimations were compared to their T1 performance, t(93) = 
8.96, p < .001, d = 0.92. Similarly, participants whose total score fell below the 25th 
percentile overestimated their average total relative score, t(99) = 8.77, p < .001, d = 0.88. 
These results indicate that poor performers overestimated their relative scores on average but 
this overestimation remained constant across analyses. 
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 Hypothesis 2b. Unlike poor performers, previous research regarding high performers 
(those whose scores were in the top 25%) is mixed: They sometimes significantly 
underestimate their absolute scores, sometimes slightly overestimate their absolute scores, 
and are sometimes able to accurately estimate their absolute scores (i.e., they do not 
significantly over- or underestimate their absolute scores). Therefore, Hypothesis 2b 
proposed a difference for relative estimates only, and the analysis was more exploratory for 
absolute estimates. Three paired-samples t-tests revealed that estimated absolute scores of 
participants in the top quartile on T1 were significantly lower than their actual absolute score 
on T1, t(130) = -3.03, p = .003, d = -0.26, indicating that they underestimated their absolute 
scores on T1. When the absolute scores on T1 of these participants were compared to their 
total absolute estimates, results indicated that there was no significant difference, t(130) = -
1.67, p = .10, d = -0.15. Lastly, when examining total absolute scores and estimations, results 
indicated that the estimated absolute scores of participants in the top quartile were 
significantly higher than their actual absolute score, t(114) = 3.96, p < .001, d = 0.39. These 
results suggest that, in this sample, high performers underestimated their absolute scores on 
T1. However, they overestimated their absolute scores on average over all subtests (trial was 
not examined here). 
When examining relative scores, however, a different pattern emerged. Results of 
three paired-samples t-tests comparing the relative and estimated relative scores indicated 
that, for T1, high performers underestimated their relative score compared to their actual 
relative score, t(130) = -14.52, p <.001, d = -1.27. When comparing total relative estimates 
and performance on T1, high performers continued to underestimate their performance, 
t(130) = -17.39, p < .001, d = -1.52. Lastly, when examining total relative scores and 
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estimates, results indicate that high performers persisted in underestimating their relative 
performance, t(114) = -16.46, p < .001, d = -1.54. These results suggest that high performers 
consistently underestimated their relative performance across all four trials. 
Hypothesis 3. Previous research suggests that the magnitude of both absolute and 
relative misestimation will be greater for poor performers than for high performers. To test 
this hypothesis, I first conducted three one-way ANOVAs examining the differences in 
absolute misestimation among the four performance quartiles similarly to the sets of analyses 
above. In these analyses, I also specifically compared the differences in misestimation 
between the top and bottom quartiles using linear contrasts. Results of the first analysis 
comparing absolute misestimation at T1 indicated that absolute misestimation differed 
significantly across quartiles (ranked by T1 scores), F(3, 441) = 28.98 p < .001, ηp2 = .17. 
Additionally, linear contrasts revealed that absolute misestimation was significantly greater 
for participants in the bottom quartile than those in the top quartile, t(441) = 9.23, p <.001, d 
= 0.44. The second analysis examining total absolute misestimation indicated that absolute 
misestimation differed significantly across T1 quartiles, F(3, 441) = 17.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 
Additionally, linear contrasts revealed that absolute misestimation was significantly greater 
for participants in the bottom quartile than those in the top quartile, t(441) = 7.25, p <.001, d 
= 0.34. The last analysis indicated that total absolute misestimation differed significantly 
across quartiles (ranked by total scores), F(3, 441) = 27.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Linear 
contrasts revealed that absolute misestimation was significantly greater for participants in the 
bottom quartile than those in the top quartile, t(441) = 8.82, p <.001, d = 0.42. These results 
taken together support my hypothesis that absolute misestimation would be higher for poor 
performers and replicate previous research. 
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The same analyses as above were performed on the relative misestimations of 
participants. Because Levene’s statistic indicated a lack of homogeneity of variance, all Fs(3, 
441) ≥ 2.73, ps ≤ .043, values that have been adjusted for this violation of assumptions are 
reported (Brown-Forsythe). Results of the first one-way ANOVA in this set of analyses 
indicate that relative misestimations also differed significantly across the four quartiles at T1, 
F(3, 310.95) = 87.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .38. Linear contrasts also revealed that, similar to 
absolute misestimations, relative misestimations were higher for participants in the bottom 
quartile than in the top quartile, t(166.97) = 14.58, p < .001, d = 1.13. The second analysis 
also identified a difference between the total relative misestimations of participants grouped 
by T1 quartiles, F(3, 299.01) = 65.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. Linear contrasts revealed again that 
relative misestimations were higher for participants in the bottom quartile than in the top 
quartile, t(161.73) = 12.69, p < .001, d = 1.06. Results of the last one-way ANOVA in this set 
of analyses indicate that total relative misestimations differed significantly across the four 
quartiles, F(3, 399.86) = 122.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. Linear contrasts revealed that relative 
misestimations were higher for participants in the bottom quartile than in the top quartile, 
t(185.62) = 16.75, p < .001, d = 1.23. These results also support my hypothesis that poor 
performing participants would show greater relative misestimation than high performing 
participants and replicate previous findings. 
Competing Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2a, & 4.2b. To test the competing hypotheses that environmental 
feedback (i.e., indirect feedback gleaned across trials that was not explicitly given to the 
participants) would either aid only the estimations of high performers (Hypothesis 4.1) or 
would aid the estimations of both high and poor performers (Hypothesis 4.2a) with the 
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greatest calibration seen for poor performers (Hypothesis 4.2b), I conducted pairs of Mixed 
ANOVAs analogous to the analyses above. It is important to note that, because 
misestimations across all four trials are being examined, the first comparison made in each 
set of the analyses above (comparing T1 scores to T1 estimations) cannot be made here. It is 
also important to note that, because I am not testing the effect of direct feedback, only the no 
feedback condition will be examined in these analyses. The first (4 quartile x 4 trial) Mixed 
ANOVA examined the change in absolute misestimation over the four trials while 
controlling for T1 quartile rank.  The results of this analysis indicated that there was a 
significant main effect of T1 quartile rank on absolute misestimation, F(3, 105) = 8.19, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .19, a significant interaction between T1 quartile rank and trial, F(9, 99) = 1.94, p 
= .046, ηp2 = .05, but no main effect of trial F(3, 105) = ,40, p = .75, ηp2 = .00 (see Figure 4, 
bottom panel). These results overall indicate that T1 performance significantly affected 
absolute misestimation and the degree to which misestimation changed across time differed 
depending on participants’ performance such that participants with more extreme scores 
exhibited greater calibration over time.  
To analyze this relationship more closely and to replicate previous analyses, between-
subjects contrasts comparing the bottom and top T1 quartiles indicated that low performers 
reported significantly higher absolute misestimations than high performers, F(1, 107) = 
24.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Polynomial within-subjects contrasts examining the interaction 
between T1 quartile and trial identified a linear, F(3, 105) = 3.08, p = .031, ηp2 = .08, 
relationship. This contrast did not reveal any effect of trial when examining them 
independently, Fs < 1.10, ps > .296. These results partially replicate previous findings and 
suggest that while there was a negative relationship between T1 performance and absolute 
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misestimation, there was also a negative relationship between T1 performance and change in 
absolute misestimation such that poor performing participants showed the most calibration 
on average. These results repudiate Hypothesis 4.1, partially support Hypothesis 4.2a, and 
fully support Hypothesis 4.2b.  
The second (4 quartile x 4 trial) Mixed ANOVA examining the change in absolute 
misestimation over the four trials while controlling for total score quartile rank indicated that 
there was a significant main effect of total score quartile rank on absolute misestimation, F(3, 
108) = 18.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, no significant interaction between total score quartile rank 
and trial, F(9, 99) = 1.69 p = .090, ηp2 = .05, and no main effect of trial F(3, 105) = 0.40, p = 
.756, ηp2 = .00 (see Figure 4, top panel). These results overall indicate that total performance 
was significantly related to absolute misestimation, but, unlike when T1 quartiles are 
examined, not the degree to which misestimation changed across time.  
Similar to when T1 quartiles are examined, between-subjects contrasts comparing the 
bottom and top total score quartiles indicated that poor performing participants exhibited 
greater absolute misestimation than high scoring participants, F(1, 107) = 25.20, p < .001, ηp2 
= .20. Polynomial within-subjects contrasts did not detect any differences in the change in 
absolute misestimation across trials between the top and bottom quartiles, all Fs < .0.91, ps > 
.342. These results are somewhat consistent with previous research and the above analysis in 
that absolute misestimation was negatively related to performance. However, there was no 
significant calibration of absolute estimations over time across all participants (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 4.1).  
The third (4 quartile x 4 trial) Mixed ANOVA examined the change in relative 
misestimation in the no feedback condition over the four trials while controlling for T1 
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quartile rank. The results of this analysis indicated that there was a significant main effect of 
T1 quartile rank on relative misestimation, F(3, 105) = 16.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, no 
significant main effect of trial F(3, 105) = 0.59, p = .623, ηp2 = .01, and no significant 
interaction between T1 quartile rank and trial, F(9, 99) = 1.46, p = .162, ηp2 = .04 (see Figure 
5, bottom panel). These results overall indicate that T1 performance was significantly related 
to relative misestimation but not the degree to which misestimation changed across time 
differed depended on participants’ performance. Additionally, like with absolute 
misestimations, relative misestimations did not change over time.  
Between-subjects contrasts comparing the bottom and top T1 quartiles indicated that 
low performers overestimated their relative estimations compared to high performers, F(3, 
107) = 39.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. Polynomial within-subjects contrasts identified no 
significant effects of trial on relative misestimation, all Fs < 1.14, ps > .288. When 
examining the interaction between T1 quartile and trial, these contrasts identified a 
marginally nonsignificant linear relationship between T1 quartile and trial, F(3, 105) = 2.63, 
p = .054, ηp2 = .07. These results partially replicate previous findings and suggest that there 
was a negative relationship between T1 performance and relative misestimation. While there 
was no significant main effect of trial nor a significant interaction between T1 quartile and 
trial (supporting Hypothesis 4.1), the marginally nonsignificant linear relationship between 
T1 quartile and trial suggests that Hypotheses 4.2a & b be examined further before being 
discounted. 
The fourth (4 quartile x 4 trial) Mixed ANOVA examining the change in relative 
misestimations of the no feedback group over the four trials while controlling for total score 
quartile rank indicated that there was a significant main effect of total score quartile rank on 
DECONSTRUCTING THE UNSKILLED-AND-UNAWARE PROBLEM                         36 
relative misestimation, F(3, 105) = 23.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, and a significant interaction 
between total score quartile and trial, F(9, 99) = 2.56, p = .008, ηp2 = .07. However, similar to 
the previous analysis, there was no main effect of trial F(3, 05) = 0.61, p = .609, ηp2 = .01 
(see Figure 5, top panel). These results are somewhat consistent with previous research and 
the above analyses in that relative misestimation was negatively related to performance. The 
significant interaction between total score quartile and trial, coupled with the lack of a 
significant effect of trial, suggests that, overall, even though relative misestimations did not 
change over time, they did significantly change for some quartiles (see below). 
Between-subjects contrasts comparing the bottom and top total score quartiles 
indicated that low performers overestimated their relative estimations compared to high 
performers, F(1, 108) = 58.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Polynomial within-subjects contrasts 
examining the change in absolute misestimation across trials did not identify any trends, all 
Fs < 0.81, ps > .371. The only trend that significantly described the interaction between total 
score quartile and relative misestimation was a cubic one, F(3, 105) = 5.77, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.14. These results are somewhat consistent with previous research in that absolute 
misestimation was negatively related to performance. Additionally, even though no 
significant main effect of trial on relative misestimation was identified (tentatively 
supporting Hypothesis 4.1), the cubic interaction between total score quartile and trial 
suggests that the further participants’ score were from the mean, the more they calibrated 
their scores over trial (supporting Hypothesis 4.2a & b). 
Hypotheses 5.1a & 5.1b. To simultaneously examine the effects of differing levels of 
performance and feedback on misestimation as well as how these effects varied over time, 
two multilevel models (MLM) were constructed; one model to predict absolute 
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misestimation, one model to predict relative misestimation. These models were constructed 
using the Mixed Process in SPSS 22 software. In each analysis, the first predictor entered 
was the participants’ performance as this has consistently been the strongest predictor of 
misestimation in the literature to date (Ehrlinger et al., 2008, Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 
Ryvkin et al., 2012). The models were built from this point one step at a time adding first 
absolute feedback, then relative feedback, and then the repeated measure effect of trial. The 
decision to include absolute feedback before relative feedback was somewhat arbitrary; 
however, it seemed prudent to include both forms of feedback before the repeated measures 
effect to facilitate interpretation of the results. At each step the fit of the model was compared 
to that of the previous model by examining the change in the -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL). 
Because the feedback conditions and trial were experimental manipulations in this study, an 
a priori rule was used in model development such that these predictors would be added to the 
model as fixed effects regardless of whether they significantly improved model fit or not. 
After these were added, however, the rule that model development would cease at the point 
that the change in the -2LL was no longer statistically significant based on the χ2 test was 
used. Both models used Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimations (to compare model fit of 
subsequent models) as well as unstructured covariance matrices. Fixed intercepts and slopes 
were modeled because in every case they produced greater model fit than random effects did. 
Inferential tests of main effects are derived from the best-fitting model. Tables 5 and 6 (upper 
panels) outline the overall model statistics. Group-mean and Grand-mean centering were not 
utilized in these analyses because all predictors and outcomes are in a meaningful metric, and 
the data are not nested within groups (only within subjects).  
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As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, when predicting both absolute misestimation and 
relative misestimation, the best fitting models are the ones that include all four predictors 
entered as fixed main effects without any random intercepts, slopes, or interactions. When 
the dependent nature of this within-subject effect is accounted for in the models (by 
specifying trial as a repeated measure effect), and data are nested within participants, the 
model fit is significantly improved in both cases. Additionally, it is important to note that 
more complex models including random intercepts, slopes, and interactions were tested 
against the (comparatively) simple models presented above. Specifically, once the four fixed 
main effects were entered and trial specified as a repeated measure predictor, I tested whether 
or not allowing the intercepts to vary (i.e., specifying them as random) improved model fit. 
When it did not for either outcome, I then tested whether or not allowing the slopes of the 
predictors to vary by specifying them as random effects would improve model fit. Model fit 
was not improved in this case either. This pattern of nonsignificant improvement to model fit 
continued when I added the two-way interactions (and subsequently, three- and four-way 
interactions) of the predictors to the model. At this point, model development and testing 
ceased. It is important to note that, even though many of the more complex models fit the 
data equally well (i.e., their fit indices were not worse than the simpler model), they did not 
significantly improve model fit and therefore were less parsimonious.  
The two resulting models largely replicate the analyses described above (cf., the two 
Mixed-ANOVAs examining total score quartile rank and trial). Where the above analyses are 
somewhat limited in that they can only examine a few select factors at any given time (e.g., 
the effect of performance across time on misestimation) without a significant loss in power, 
one of MLM’s strengths is that it can simultaneous account for many sources of variance 
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when predicting an outcome. In light of this, when performance, both forms of feedback, and 
trial are all considered, there is still a strong overarching negative relationship between 
performance and each type of misestimation such that the lowest performers exhibit the most 
misestimation. However, unlike in the above analyses, when the effect of feedback is taken 
into account, there is a significant negative relationship between trial and absolute 
misestimation and a negative relationship between trial and relative misestimation that is 
approaching significance (see bottoms of Tables 5 & 6). These results indicate that 
misestimations were changing over time but that this change could only be detected when the 
effect of feedback was taken into consideration. As for the effect of feedback on 
misestimation, the only effect approaching significance was for absolute feedback on relative 
misestimation (p = .07). Overall these results support my hypothesis that there would be a 
negative relationship between performance and misestimation (Hypothesis 1b) as well as my 
hypothesis that participants would be able to calibrate their performance across trials 
(Hypothesis 4.2a). It does not support my hypothesis that feedback would have a direct effect 
on misestimation (Hypotheses 5.1a & b), however. 
Hypotheses 6.1, 6.2a, & 6.2b. To better understand the potential regression to the 
mean effect, I first compared the correlations between subtest scores to the theoretical 
maximum correlations one would expect to observe on the basis of measurement error alone.  
Given an average reliability of .67 for each subtest (range .63 to .74), the average maximum 
correlation one could expect to observe between subtests would be .67 (range .63 to .71), 
according to the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula.  Correlations between subtests 
averaged .70 (range .66 to .73), which are virtually identical to the predicted range. 
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Therefore, any subtest-to-subtest performance differences may attributable to unreliability in 
the measurements.  
To further examine this effect, I conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA. Results of 
this analysis indicated that, overall, participants’ scores did not change over trials, F(3, 1332) 
= 1.00, p = .390, ηp2 = .00. I also conducted a (4: total score quartile x 4: trial) Mixed-
ANOVA to examine whether or not change in participants’ scores differed by performance 
level. The results of this analysis indicated that participants’ scores differed significantly by 
quartile (though this effect is essentially meaningless given the nature of the analysis), F(3, 
441) = 22,218.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .98. More importantly, though, was that there was no 
significant effect of trial nor an interaction between trial and quartile, Fs < .90, ps > .45. 
Taken in conjunction with the lack of support for feedback and the strong support for the 
BTA effect, these findings imply stronger support for the regression to the mean explanation 
proposed in Hypotheses 6.2 than for the negligible effect proposed in Hypothesis 6.1. 
Discussion 
The present study expands the current literature on the UUP by both parsing out the 
effects of different kinds of feedback on different kinds of misestimations while also more 
closely examining the role of measurement error in explaining the pattern of results seen thus 
far.  Although there are aspects of the UUP phenomenon on which many researchers agree, 
there are additional aspects on which they disagree. Similar to the sections above, this 
discussion will be organized in part along that distinction. First, I will discuss the findings 
concerning and the implications of the hypotheses that the previous researchers largely agree 
on. Following this, I will discuss the findings concerning the competing hypotheses on the 
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effect of feedback on misestimation. After this, I will discuss the findings relating to the 
competing regression to the mean hypotheses.  
UUP findings 
 The first hypothesis concerns overestimation. While previous research has shown that 
participants reliably overestimate their absolute and relative performance on average 
(Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999), this was not always the case in this study. 
Even though participants in the current study did overestimate their absolute performance on 
average, and this overestimation was greatest when comparing total scores to total absolute 
estimations, the opposite pattern was found for relative estimations. The approach of this 
study was to examine misestimation when the average number of questions answered 
correctly was approximately half (50%) of the total number of questions to avoid the 
measurement limitations associated with ceiling or floor effects. In the scale development 
process, I utilized the normed item-level difficulty data provided by Condon and Revelle 
(2014; see their supplementary online material as well) to construct four subtests that had 
difficulties as close as possible to 50% correct while also maintaining approximately equal 
variability in difficulty. The participants in the current sample answered 18 of 40 questions 
correctly on average, but estimated they had answered approximately 23 of 40 correctly. 
Much of the previous research relies on measures vulnerable to ceiling effects. This has 
raised the question of whether overestimation of performance could be in large part an 
artifact of using “easy” tests (see also Dunning, 2011 for a remark on this potential limitation 
and Kruger, 1999 for a demonstrations of a “below-average” effect). This study has 
demonstrated that, even when an arguably more difficult test is used, a very strong tendency 
to overestimate one’s absolute performance can still be elicited.  
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 The same was not found for relative estimations, however. Because relative 
estimations and scores are measured in percentiles (and thus centered at 50%), average 
relative estimations below the 50th percentile indicate underestimation. In this sample, when 
comparing total relative estimations to total relative scores, participants estimated on average 
that they performed better than 43% of other participants in the sample, statistically 
significantly different from the true average (50%). These two results taken together present 
an interesting picture. These results seem to suggest that while participants thought they did a 
good deal better than they actually did on average, they were still able to identify the test as 
being a difficult one.  
 The second hypothesis, that misestimations would be negatively related to 
performance, more directly addressed the UUP. The results of this study directly support this 
hypothesis and replicate previous findings on the UUP by demonstrating that the poorer 
participants performed, the greater their absolute and relative overestimation. These results 
are interesting because, according to Krueger and Mueller (2002), correcting for the 
asymmetrical distribution of scores around the median possible correct (which was controlled 
in this study by constructing a test with an average score of approximately 50% correct) 
should help to reduce the asymmetry in the magnitude of misestimations of participants who 
scored above and below the mean. However, this was not the case in the current study. The 
results of the analyses addressing this hypothesis are not entirely conclusive because they do 
not take into account the effects of the experimental manipulations present in this study on 
misestimation and cannot compare the pattern of misestimation of multiple groups that took 
tests of varying difficulties. Thus, while not definitive, the results of these analyses suggest 
that the asymmetrical pattern of misestimation may not be due entirely to statistical artifact 
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seeing how a negative relationship between performance and misestimation was found even 
when utilizing a test that is both highly reliable and has an average score of approximately 
50%. Moreover, employing a repeated-measure design that allowed participants to make 
multiple estimates of performance reduced the likelihood that observed misestimations were 
simply a result of chance errors, as is possible when single observation methods are utilized. 
While the BTA heuristic and the negative relationship between performance and 
misestimation are fundamental aspects of the UUP, another focus of the UUP literature has 
been on differing patterns of misestimation across levels of performance. Specifically, 
previous research suggests that poor performing participants would overestimate both their 
absolute and relative scores (Hypothesis 2a) while high performing individuals would 
underestimate their relative scores but not necessarily their absolute scores (Hypothesis 2b; 
Ehrlinger et al., 2008). The results of the analyses addressing Hypothesis 2a strongly support 
the prediction that poor performers would significantly overestimate both their absolute and 
relative performance. When absolute misestimations are looked at specifically, however, it 
should be noted that the smallest effect size was found when comparing T1 estimations to 
total scores, the second smallest effect size was found when comparing T1 estimations to T1 
scores, and the largest effect size was found when total estimations were compared to total 
scores. The large difference in overestimation between the T1-T1 and Total-Total 
comparisons suggests that absolute estimation increased across trials for poor performers. 
The same was not true when examining relative overestimation for poor performers as the 
magnitude of overestimation remained relatively constant. However, this pattern of results 
might be explained by the increased reliability of the Total scores, relative to the T1 scores. 
More detailed analyses of the change in misestimation over time will be discussed below. 
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In comparison to poor performers, high performers exhibited a different pattern of 
results. When comparing absolute scores and estimates at T1, high performers demonstrated 
a significant underestimation of their performance similar to what has been observed in 
previous research on the UUP. However, the difference between absolute estimations and 
scores disappeared when comparing T1 scores to total absolute estimations. This trend 
continued and ultimately resulted in a reversal of the pattern of misestimation when total 
score were compared to total absolute estimations such that, at this point, high performers 
significantly overestimated their performance. Previous research on the UUP almost 
ubiquitously utilizes single-observation designs that the T1-T1 comparison of absolute scores 
and estimations here emulates. When a repeated-measure design is used and scores and 
estimations across all observations are compared, however, it is apparent that the tendency 
for high performers to underestimate their absolute scores not only reverses, the 
overestimation across the entire series of tests is greater in magnitude than the initial 
underestimation. Taken together with the results addressing poor performers’ absolute 
misestimations, these results suggest that instead of an unequal and opposite direction of 
absolute misestimation between low and high performers (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999) or even a symmetrical and opposite, but lesser, difference in absolute 
misestimation (Krueger & Mueller, 2002), a different pattern may be taking place. For both 
high and low performers, the average absolute estimations seem to be increasing over time 
relative to those at the first trial of the experiment.  
What this may suggest is not an opposite effect of performance on misestimation such 
that poor performers overestimate their scores and high performers underestimate theirs. 
Instead, it may suggest that there is a similar positive linear trend in absolute estimations for 
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low and high performers but that the points at which they initially anchor their estimations 
differ. If this were the case, research designs employing single observations would fail to 
detect this trend and might erroneously infer that some set of cognitive biases (those 
specified originally by the researchers proposing the UUP) or randomly distributed 
imprecision of ability measures and participant self/other assessments (Krueger & Mueller, 
2002) explains the previously observed pattern of results. The data here, however, suggest 
that while some cognitive process is most likely at work and this pattern of results is not 
simply a result of poor reliability alone, it is not necessarily caused by the same biases 
proposed originally to explain it. 
To complicate the matter further, the results concerning high performers’ relative 
misestimations follow a different pattern. As can be seen above, high performers greatly 
underestimated their relative scores and this underestimation remained relatively constant 
across all three comparison points. Taken together with the results demonstrating poor 
performers’ reliable overestimation of their relative scores, the explanations given both by 
the proponents of the UUP (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999) and Krueger 
and Mueller (2002) are plausible here. The direction of relative misestimation replicates what 
has been found in previous research on the UUP, supporting in part the explanations 
provided by these researchers. However, the relative magnitudes of misestimation here do 
not replicate the results of previous researchers. Instead, high performers actually 
demonstrated a greater magnitude of relative misestimation than did poor performers. As 
mentioned earlier, the average percent correct across all four tests was 44.9%, which is 
slightly under half; this could presumably explain the reversal in the asymmetry in magnitude 
of misestimation as implied by Krueger and Mueller.  
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Effects of feedback 
It is clear from the results discussed thus far that many of the participants in this study 
exhibited significant inaccuracy when estimating their performance; however, the main novel 
question this study aimed to answer regarded the information people need to make accurate 
self-assessments. Previous research by Ryvkin et al. (2012) proposed this question, and the 
current study directly expanded upon their investigation. While the original proponents of the 
UUP suggested that people, especially poor performers, generally lack the requisite skills 
necessary for accurate self-insight (and thus misestimate their performance; Ehrlinger et al., 
2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999), Ryvkin et al. (2012) found that poor performers not only 
recognize their poor performance, but that they calibrated their estimations of their 
performance even without explicit feedback concerning their performance when given 
enough time. In fact, given that poor performers’ misestimations are generally the most 
inaccurate at first and therefore have the most room to improve, Ryvkin et al. (2012) 
predicted that poor performers would show the most calibration in their estimations over 
time; a prediction that was supported by the results of their study. 
This set of competing hypotheses was tested in two waves in this study. The first 
utilized the mixed-ANOVAs described above that treated the data analogously to the 
previous research (by grouping performance into quartiles). In these analyses, the change in 
both absolute and relative misestimations of participants in different quartiles in the no 
feedback condition was compared across the four trials. When participants were grouped by 
their T1 performance it was found that participants in the top and bottom quartiles 
demonstrated some calibration over time, partially supporting the hypotheses given by 
Ryvkin et al. (2012). Interestingly, though, this effect disappeared when participants were 
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grouped by their total score quartiles. This discrepancy could have possibly resulted from the 
movement of participants in one quartile at T1 to another quartile when total scores were 
examined. Should this be the case, these results support the regression to the mean hypothesis 
by emphasizing that participants’ scores on a first (i.e., single) observation may not actually 
be indicative of their true ability. Thus, indicators of misestimation (i.e., the difference of 
estimated scores and actual scores) based on single observations may be exaggerated, 
overemphasizing the differences in high and low performers’ ability to estimate their own 
performance. Additionally, the cubic relationship of T1 quartile rank and trial on 
misestimation (i.e., that the top and bottom quartiles demonstrated more calibration than did 
the two middle quartiles) also supports the regression to the mean hypothesis. 
One limitation of the mixed-ANOVAs used in this study is that they did not examine 
the effect of different kinds of feedback directly. While it is possible to conduct an ANOVA 
of this type with three factors instead of just the two used here, doing so would have resulted 
in a 4-quartile x 4-feedback condition x 4-trial analysis. This analysis would have been 
comprised of 64 cells and the current sample size of 445 would have had inadequate power to 
detect the effects of interest. This concern, though, is obviated by the fact that performance 
was measured as a continuous variable and thus the MLM described above could examine all 
three factors simultaneously without suffering the same loss of power that utilizing a 4 x 4 x 
4 mixed-ANOVA would have encountered.  
By examining the data using MLM, I was able to not only measure the change in 
misestimation over time, but was also able to take into account the effect of feedback while 
doing so. In contrast to the results of the mixed-ANOVAs, the two resulting MLMs identified 
significant main effects of performance and trial (though, for relative misestimation, the 
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effect of trial only approached significance). What this indicates is that misestimations do in 
fact improve over time, but this change may only be observed when the feedback condition is 
accounted for. Considering the stronger effect of trial on misestimation in MLM analyses 
than in the Mixed-ANOVA analyses, this would suggest that an interaction might exist 
between two or more of the predictors or that feedback (with a marginally nonsignificant 
effect being of absolute feedback on relative misestimation) or that the effect of one of the 
predictors was being suppressed by another. While significant interactions were detected 
when more complex models were examined, their addition did not provide a significant 
benefit to the fit of the model, so they were not be reported or interpreted here. 
These results as a whole, while supporting some of the claims of the original 
proponents of the UUP, seriously challenge others. It is apparent that the design and analyses 
of previous research have overemphasized (though not completely misconstrued) the lack of 
individuals’ ability to estimate their own performance. Poor performing individuals (as well 
as high performing ones) can and do improve their estimations of their performance when 
given the requisite time and sources of information to draw on. Additionally, the asymmetry 
in misestimation originally identified by the proponents of the UUP does seem to be at least 
in part a result of the ability measures that have been used and not so much the participants 
themselves. Curiously, while some analyses implied an effect of feedback, once trial was 
added as a predictor, feedback appeared to be redundant; therefore, the nature of its 
relationship to misestimation and how this relationship may depend on an individual’s level 
of performance is still unclear.  
One limitation of the analyses of this study was that the feedback that each participant 
received was unique to that participant; the feedback each participant received was based on 
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his or her performance such that high performers received different feedback than did low 
performers. Related to this, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about the effect of 
feedback on misestimation because even though whether or not participants received 
feedback was explicitly manipulated, the specific feedback they received was not (it was 
instead based on their actual performance). Being able to compare the effects of accurate 
feedback versus inaccurate feedback (e.g., telling participants they did well when they did 
not) could help to further elucidate this phenomenon by removing the dependency between 
participants’ scores and the feedback they receive. It would also be helpful to vary the 
difficulty of the test in a single study so that the effects of different test difficulties can be 
compared directly. Even though the order of the subtests in this study was randomized, all 
participants ultimately took the exact same 40-item test and therefore the objective difficulty 
of the test was constant. While this is helpful in many ways, utilizing tests of varying 
difficulties would allow researchers to study not only how misestimation differs for high and 
low performers, but whether or not the pattern of misestimation is dependent in part on the 
difficulty of the test itself. 
Ultimately, while this study serves to further elucidate the UUP by demonstrating that 
participants (especially those who performed poorly) were not entirely blind to their poor 
performance and that the design of the study and the ability measure used do play some part 
in explaining the pattern of results seen thus far, it also demonstrates that there is a reliable 
and systematic pattern of misestimation that may be resulting from some cognitive bias. 
Additionally, contrary to what was found by Ryvkin et al. (2012), explicit feedback on one’s 
performance seemed to have a minimal effect on misestimation. What this suggests is that 
most people, even those who perform poorly, can and will make an effort to improve their 
DECONSTRUCTING THE UNSKILLED-AND-UNAWARE PROBLEM                         50 
estimations of their own performance, given enough time. The information they use to make 
these calibrations, however, is still unclear, as calibration was seen even in the absence of 
feedback. Researchers attempting to discover how to mitigate inaccurate self-insight should 
not assume that there is no hope for the unskilled. However, providing individuals with the 
information they need to make accurate self-assessments of performance, both relative and 
absolute, may need to be more of an iterative, contextualized, experiential process such as the 
classroom setting used in Study 1 by Ryvkin et al. than an objectively explicit one such as the 
feedback given in the current study. 
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Table 1 
Converging Hypotheses and Associated Statistical Tests 
 
Hypothesis Label Abridged Hypothesis Statistical Test 
1a Replicate BTA Heuristic Paired-sample t-test 
1b Replicate UUP Correlation 
2a Overestimation of poor 
performers 
Paired-sample t-test 
2b Underestimation of high 
performers 
Paired-sample t-test 
3 Misestimation greater for 
poor performers 
One-way ANOVA with 
planned contrast 
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Table 2 
Competing Hypotheses and Associated Statistical Tests 
 
Hypothesis 
Label 
Ehrlinger et al. 
(2008) and 
Kruger and 
Dunning (1999) 
Hypothesis 
Label 
Ryvkin et al. 
(2012) 
Statistical Test 
4.1 Only high 
performers will 
gain from 
indirect feedback 
4.2a Both high and 
low performers 
will gain from 
indirect 
feedback 
Mixed-ANOVA 
& multiple 
regression  
  4.2b Poor performers 
will benefit the 
most 
Mixed-ANOVA 
& multiple 
regression 
5.1a Absolute 
performance 
feedback will 
help high and 
low performers 
better calibrate 
all estimations 
5.2 (Makes no 
prediction of 
varying effects 
of absolute vs. 
relative 
feedback.) 
Mixed-ANOVA 
& multiple 
regression 
5.1b Relative 
performance 
feedback will aid 
high performers’ 
estimations but 
exacerbate low 
performers’ 
relative 
misestimations 
  Mixed-ANOVA 
& multiple 
regression 
 Ehrlinger et al. 
(2008) and 
Kruger and 
Dunning (1999) 
 Krueger and 
Mueller (2002) 
 
6.1 Regression to 
the mean is 
negligible 
6.2a Participants’ 
score will 
regress to the 
mean across 
trials 
Regression & 
SEM 
  6.2b This effect will 
be largest for 
participants with 
the most 
extreme scores 
Regression & 
SEM 
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Table 3 
Means (and SDs) of T1 Scores, Estimations, and Misestimations across T1 Quartiles 
 
 Q1 
(n = 94) 
Q2 
(n = 56) 
Q3 
(n = 164) 
Q4 
(n = 131) 
Total 
(n = 445) 
Abs. Score 
 
1.53 
(0.63) 
3.00 
(0.00) 
4.55 
(0.50) 
7.24 
(1.27) 
4.51 
(2.24) 
Est. Abs. 
Score 
3.35 
(1.88) 
3.70 
(1.79) 
5.02 
(1.81) 
6.74 
(1.82) 
5.01 
(2.24) 
Abs. Misest. 
 
1.83 
(1.97) 
0.70 
(1.79) 
0.46 
(1.78) 
-0.50 
(1.90) 
0.50 
(2.03) 
Rel. Score 
 
10.67 
(5.32) 
27.52 
(0.00) 
52.25 
(9.19) 
85.39 
(8.17) 
50.11 
(28.62) 
Est. Rel. 
Score 
34.62 
(27.75) 
37.63 
(24.71) 
41.90 
(22.77) 
56.95 
(23.37) 
44.26 
(25.73) 
Rel. Misest. 
 
23.94 
(29.20) 
10.10 
(24.71) 
-10.34 
(23.62) 
-28.44 
(22.42) 
-5.86 
(31.37) 
Note. Est. = Estimated, Misest. = Misestimation, Abs. = Absolute, Rel. = Relative, numbers 
in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 4 
 
Means (and SDs) of Actual Scores, Estimations, and Misestimations across Total Score 
Quartiles 
 
 Q1 
(n = 100) 
Q2 
(n = 108) 
Q3 
(n = 122) 
Q4 
(n = 115) 
Total 
(n = 445) 
Abs. Score 
 
 
7.86 
(1.81) 
13.37 
(1.85) 
19.90 
(1.99) 
29.01 
(3.66) 
17.96 
(8.18) 
Est. Abs. Score 
 
 
16.81 
(6.57) 
19.72 
(4.88) 
24.92 
(5.52) 
31.10 
(6.55) 
23.43 
(7.99) 
Abs. Misest. 
 
 
8.95 
(6.62) 
6.35 
(4.89) 
5.02 
(5.51) 
2.10 
(5.68) 
5.47 
(6.17) 
Rel. Score 
 
 
11.35 
(6.39) 
34.71 
(6.92) 
60.56 
(7.85) 
87.19 
(7.46) 
50.11 
(28.88) 
Est. Rel. Score 
 
 
31.56 
(21.70) 
35.55 
(17.39) 
43.44 
(18.09) 
59.72 
(18.86) 
43.06 
(21.77) 
Rel. Misest. 
 
20.21 
(23.06) 
0.83 
(17.76) 
-17.12 
(19.02) 
-27.47 
(17.89) 
-7.05 
(26.34) 
Note. Est. = Estimated, Misest. = Misestimation, Abs. = Absolute, Rel. = Relative, numbers 
in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 5 
 
Multilevel Model of Absolute Misestimation Predicted by Participants’ Performance, 
Presence/Absence of Absolute Feedback, Presence/Absence of Relative Feedback, and Trial 
 
Model F p  Δχ2  
1: Score F(1,1780) = 509.83 p < .001  -- --  
2: Score 
Abs. FB. 
F(1, 1780) = 511.06 
F(1, 1780) = 7.30 
p < .001 
p = .007 
 χ2(4) = 7.28 p = .122 
3: Score 
Abs. FB. 
Rel. FB. 
F(1, 1780) = 510.03 
F(1, 1780) = 7.58 
F(1, 1780) = 1.84 
p < .001 
p = .006 
p = .175 
 χ2(5) = 1.85 p = .869 
4: Score 
Abs. FB. 
Rel. FB. 
Trial 
F(1, 1664.39) = 894.89 
F(1, 380.94) = 2.38 
F(1, 381.01) = 0.40 
F(1, 440.95) = 5.57 
p < .001 
p = .124 
p = .526 
p = .019 
 χ2(6) = 563.08 p < .001 
Final Model b (SEb) p    
Score 
Abs. FB. 
Rel. FB. 
Trial 
b = -.64 (.02) 
b = -.23 (.15) 
b = -.09 (.15) 
b = -.07 (.03) 
p < .001 
p = .124 
p = .526 
p = .019 
   
Note. All b’s are unstandardized. Abs = Absolute. Rel = Relative. FB = Feedback. 
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Table 6 
 
Multilevel Model of Relative Misestimation Predicted by Participants’ Performance, 
Presence/Absence of Absolute Feedback, Presence/Absence of Relative Feedback, and Trial 
 
Model F p  Δχ2  
1: Score F(1,1780) = 947.52 p < .001  -- -- 
2: Score 
Abs. FB. 
F(1, 1780) = 950.4 
F(1, 1780) = 7.68 
p < .001 
p = .006 
 χ2(4) = 7.67 p = .104 
3: Score 
Abs. FB. 
Rel. FB. 
F(1, 1780) = 950.88 
F(1, 1780) = 7.55 
F(1, 1780) = 0.32 
p < .001 
p = .006 
p = .573 
 χ2(5) = 0.32 p = .997 
4: Score 
Abs. FB. 
Rel. FB. 
Trial 
F(1, 1520.34) = 1012.85 
F(1, 418.78) = 3.22 
F(1, 418.86) = 0.20 
F(1, 442.57) = 3.84 
p < .001 
p = .073 
p = .652 
p = .051 
 χ2(6) = 453.76 p < .001 
Final Model b (SEb) p    
Score 
Abs. FB. 
Rel. FB. 
Trial 
b = -9.41 (2.30) 
b = -3.34 (0.30) 
b = 0.84 (1.86) 
b = -0.76 (0.39) 
p < .001 
p = .073 
p = .652 
p = .051 
   
Note. All b’s are unstandardized. Abs = Absolute. Rel = Relative. FB = Feedback. 
!  
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Figure 1. Perceived grammar ability and test performance as a function of test performance. 
Reproduced from Kruger and Dunning (1999), Figure 3. 
 
 
  
DECONSTRUCTING THE UNSKILLED-AND-UNAWARE PROBLEM                         61 
 
Figure 2. Study 1: Average overestimation of score (left) and percentile (right) by 
performance quartile in predictions M1 (first midterm prediction), M2 (second midterm 
prediction) and F (final exam prediction), with error bars. The results for prediction F are 
shown using the breakdown by quartiles based on final performance (f-quartiles) and 
midterm performance (m-quartiles). Reproduced from Ryvkin et al. (2012), Figure 1. 
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Figure 3. Study 2: Average overestimation of score (left) and percentile (right) by 
performance quartile in Task 1 (top) and Task 2 (bottom) at Stages 1 and 2, with error bars. 
The results for Stage 2 are shown using the breakdown by quartiles based on Stage 2 
performance (S2-quartiles) and Stage 1 performance (S1-quartiles). This figure demonstrates 
the effect of indirect feedback on estimation calibration. Reproduced from Ryvkin et al. 
(2012), Figure 2. 
!  
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Figure 4. Absolute misestimation of the no feedback condition as a function of total score 
quartile (top) or T1 quartile (bottom) and trial. The figure compares the change in absolute 
misestimation over time when participants are grouped by their total score vs. their T1 score. 
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Figure 5. Relative misestimation of the no feedback condition as a function of total score 
quartile (top) or T1 quartile (bottom) and trial. The figure compares the change in relative 
misestimation over time when participants are grouped by their total score vs. their T1 score. 
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Appendix A 
IRB Approval 
From: Dr. Lisa Curtin, Institutional Review Board Chairperson 
Date: 12/08/2014  
RE: Notice of IRB Approval by Expedited Review (under 45 CFR 46.110)  
Study #: 15-0140  
 
Study Title: Deconstructing the Unskilled-and-Unaware Problem: Examining the Effect of 
Feedback on Misestimation While Disentangling Cognitive Bias from Statistical Artifact  
Submission Type: Initial  
Expedited Category: (7) Research on Group Characteristics or Behavior, or Surveys, 
Interviews, etc.  
Approval Date: 12/08/2014  
Expiration Date of Approval: 12/07/2015  
 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved this study for the period indicated above. 
The IRB found that the research procedures meet the expedited category cited above. IRB 
approval is limited to the activities described in the IRB approved materials, and extends to 
the performance of the described activities in the sites identified in the IRB application. In 
accordance with this approval, IRB findings and approval conditions for the conduct of this 
research are listed below.  
 
Approval Conditions:  
 
Appalachian State University Policies: All individuals engaged in research with human 
participants are responsible for compliance with the University policies and procedures, and 
IRB determinations.  
 
Principal Investigator Responsibilities: The PI should review the IRB's list of PI 
responsibilities. The Principal Investigator (PI), or Faculty Advisor if the PI is a student, is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring the protection of research participants; conducting sound 
ethical research that complies with federal regulations, University policy and procedures; and 
maintaining study records.  
 
Modifications and Addendums: IRB approval must be sought and obtained for any proposed 
modification or addendum (e.g., a change in procedure, personnel, study location, study 
instruments) to the IRB approved protocol, and informed consent form before changes may 
be implemented, unless changes are necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to 
participants. Changes to eliminate apparent immediate hazards must be reported promptly to 
the IRB.  
 
Approval Expiration and Continuing Review: The PI is responsible for requesting continuing 
review in a timely manner and receiving continuing approval for the duration of the research 
with human participants. Lapses in approval should be avoided to protect the welfare of 
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enrolled participants. If approval expires, all research activities with human participants must 
cease.  
 
Prompt Reporting of Events: Unanticipated Problems involving risks to participants or 
others; serious or continuing noncompliance with IRB requirements and determinations; and 
suspension or termination of IRB approval by an external entity, must be promptly reported 
to the IRB.  
 
Closing a study: When research procedures with human subjects are completed, please 
complete the Request for Closure of IRB review form and send it to irb@appstate.edu. 
!
! !
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Appendix B 
Instructions for Providing Estimations 
Instructions.  Read Carefully. 
  
In this study you will be asked to complete four 10-item tests. Please read each question 
carefully and choose the response that is most appropriate. Please try to answer the questions 
as accurately as possible without spending too much time on any one question. Please note 
that the response options might change. You will have the option to indicate that you do not 
know the answer to a question; however, please try to identify the correct answer to the 
question before selecting this option. 
  
After each test you will be asked to make two estimations about your performance on the test 
you just completed. The first question will ask you to estimate the number of questions out of 
10 that you believe you answered correctly. The second question will ask you to estimate the 
percentage of people who you think you scored higher than. The question will provide you 
with a slider bar (see below) with which you can indicate the percentage of people who you 
believe you scored higher than. For example, if you were to set the slider bar to "80", that 
would indicate that you believe that you scored higher than 80% of other people who have 
taken the test that you just took. 
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